Our research question is whether financial analysts leak proprietary information to their preferred customers by warning them of future earnings forecast revisions. We explore this question by monitoring investors' trading behavior during the weeks prior to analyst earnings forecast revisions using a unique stock transactions data set from Finland. We do not find evidence of large investors systematically being warned of future earnings forecast revisions. However, our results indicate that the very largest investors show trading behavior partly consistent with being informed about future earnings forecast revisions.
Introduction
Financial analysts play an important role in the economy by both monitoring the governance of companies and disseminating information to the stock market. Financial analysts have however recently been accused for giving biased investment advice, as well as leaking their future earnings forecast revisions to preferred customers 1 .
A condition for financial analyst information leakage being consequential is that analysts possess information that has implications for stock prices. Several studies have investigated the market impact of financial analysts' opinions on future stock performance. For instance Barber et al (2001) , Barber and Loeffler (1993), Stickel (1995) and Womack (1996) examine stock price reaction to financial analyst stock recommendations, and find that positive (negative) recommendation changes on average are followed by positive (negative) returns. Busse and Green (2002) investigate how Morning Call and Midday Call segments on CNBC TV (which report analysts' views about individual stocks) influence stock prices, and put forward evidence indicating that stock prices respond within seconds of initial mention of the analyst report. In conclusion, the emerging consensus of academic research is that the opinions of the financial analysts impact stock returns 2 . 1 See for instance Wall Street Journal August 22, 2002;
"Merrill Dismisses Stock Analyst For Alleged Warning to Clients". 2 See for instance Kothari (2001) .
Regardless of whether we view potential analyst information leakage as a phenomenon that compromises the fairness of stock markets or a Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) equilibrium, analyst information leakage has several implications for the functioning of stock markets. Our research question is hence whether financial analysts leak proprietary information to their preferred customers by warning them of future earnings forecast revisions.
We explore this question by monitoring the trading behavior of investors in Finland during the weeks prior to analyst earnings forecast revisions using a unique stock transactions data set in Finland. In summary, we do not find any convincing evidence of large investors systematically being warned of future earnings forecast revisions. On the other hand, our results indicate that the very largest investors show trading behavior partly consistent with being informed about future earnings forecast revisions. The results for these largest investors are however weakened by small sample size and other robustness problems. Our conclusion is hence that analysts do not, at least systematically, leak proprietary information to their preferred customers by warning them of future earnings forecast revisions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the hypotheses and methodology; section 3 describes the data; section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results; section 5 provides a summary.
Hypothesis and methodology
In order to be able to monitor different investors' trading behavior prior to earnings forecast revisions, we need to 1) identify the earnings forecast revisions, 2) measure investors' trading behavior, and 3) group investors according to their size.
Identifying earnings forecast revisions
We start by calculating financial analyst a's change in his/her earnings forecast on firm i's earnings during the forecasted period. Formally the earnings forecast revision is calculated as, (
Where ait REV is the scaled revision of analyst's a's earnings forecast on firm i's earnings during the forecasted period. ait E is the updated forecast, while 1 − ait E is the old forecast issued by analyst a. Absolute values are used in the denominator to allow for negative values.
One important source of information to investors as well as financial analysts is the firm's financial reports. Financial analysts often update their earnings forecasts due to the information conveyed in a financial report. Investors also make investment decisions based on financial reports 3 and hence we cannot determine if earnings revisions after financial reports impact investors' investment decisions. Therefore, we drop earnings forecast revisions that are reported during a two-week period consecutive to a financial report to diminish the impact of financial reports on investors' investment decisions in our sample.
Measuring investor trading behavior
Investors' trading behavior for a certain company is gauged by first identifying all investors, who have traded in the company stock during the two calendar weeks preceding an earnings forecast revision, from the Finnish Central Securities Depository central register 4 . The net holdings 15 days before (NH t-15 ) and one day before (NH t-1 ) the earnings forecast revision are then calculated for each investor 3 For research on the relation between publicly available financial statement information and stock returns, see e.g. Abarbanell and Bushee (1997) , Ball and Brown (1968) and Ou and Penman (1989) . 4 If a company has multiple stock series, the different series are treated as separate companies in the analysis. This approach is taken since treating different stock series as one would yield measurement errors, since the stocks of the different series might be differently valued. Totally disregarding either of the series would naturally also yield potentially severe measurement errors. separately by aggregating the initial balance and all transactions up to and including date t-15 and t-1, respectively.
An investor trading behavior proxy R t-15, t-1 is then calculated for each investor, company and earnings forecast revision:
The above defined measure R t-15, t-1 hence expresses the following. If an investor has increased his/her net holding in a stock during the time period t-15 to t-1, the measure expresses the fraction of the final position at time t-1 that has been acquired. On the other hand, if an investor has decreased his/her net holding in a stock during the time period t-15 to t-1, the measure expresses the fraction of the initial position at time t-15 that has been sold out. Finally, if an investor has traded in a stock during the time period t-15 to t-1, but not changed his/her net holding, the measure takes the value 0. Clearly, the above defined investor trading behavior proxy will be a continuous function taking values [-1, 1] . Further, the investor trading behavior proxy is symmetric, which is important in order to not introduce a bias in the variable.
An obvious alternative when measuring investors' trading behavior is to calculate the simple change in NH during the time period t-15 to t-1. The above defined approach is however preferred for one fundamental and two econometric reasons. First, we believe that the investor trading behavior proxy defined in equations (2), (3) and (4) better expresses how investors themselves perceive their actions 5 . Second, if we employ the simple changes methodology an econometric problem occurs when the initial position NH t-15 equals 0 (division by zero). Third, the simple changes methodology by default induces a bias in R t-15, t-1 since the distribution is asymmetric, taking values [-1, ∞[ when NH t-15 ≠ 0.
Another alternative when measuring investors' trading behavior is to employ a discrete framework, by for instance assigning the trading behavior proxy variable the value 0 for decreases in holdings and 1 5 This argument is primarily derived from the situation where we have small denominators. For instance, if an investor owns 100 shares and then acquires 1000 more, the percentage change would be 1100 / 100 -1 = 1000%. The corresponding measure according to equation (1) would on the other hand take the value (1100-100) / 1100 = 91%, which seems somewhat more intuitive.
for increases in holdings. However, by moving into a discrete framework we lose the magnitude of the trading behavior, as only the direction of the trading behavior remains. In summary, the in equations (2), (3) and (4) proposed and in this study employed way of measuring trading behavior enables us to measure both the direction and the magnitude of trading behavior, however avoiding the pitfalls of the simple changes methodology.
Measuring investor size
In order to measure investor size, we create two alternative investor size variables: one expressing relative size and one expressing absolute size. The relative size variable is generated by dividing the observations for each firm and earnings forecast revision separately into 10 equally large groups according to the net holding in number of shares at date t-15. The absolute size variable is created by dividing the observations into 10 equally large groups according to the net holding in Euros at date t-15. The created size groups are denoted by values from 1 (smallest 10 th of initial holding) to 10 (largest 10 th of initial holding).
Data
We have combined two data sets in the study, 1) the Finnish Central Securities Depository central register data set and 2) the Institutional Brokers Estimate System (I/B/E/S) provided by Thomson Financial.
The Finnish Securities Depository Central Register data set
The employed transaction data set is, to the best of our knowledge, one of the most comprehensive and complete transaction data sets that have been employed in this field of research up to this date. The Finnish Central Securities Depository central register contains virtually all transactions for the stocks of listed Finnish companies during the time period December 28 1994 to May 30 2000 with daily accuracy. The data set covers approximately 97% of the total market capitalization of the Helsinki Stock Exchange as of the beginning of the sample period, as reported by Grinblatt and Keloharju (2000) , and further expands to cover all traded companies from the middle of the investigated period onwards. The Finnish Central Securities Depository central register is the official register of ownership, controlled by the Finnish Financial Supervision Authority, and can hence be viewed as extremely reliable and accurate. Altogether the data set consists of 25,400,767 observations for a total of 1,050,412 different investors, complete with transaction information (notification date, price, volume etc.) and investor characteristics information (investor type, birth year, postal code, sex etc.). A settlement lag of three trading days is conventional on the Helsinki Stock Exchange and the date stamps in the data set include this lag, which is adjusted for in the empirical analysis presented below. Due to this three-day settlement lag, the transactions in the database are stamped between January 2 1995 and June 2 2000, and the initial balance as of December 27 1994 is stamped as January 1 1995.
Investors are categorized into six major groups according to their legal status. These six groups are further divided into several subgroups according to more specific characteristics. All Finnish individuals and institutions are required to register their holdings in their own name, but foreigners can choose to act in the name of a nominee. The holdings of foreigners that choose to act in a nominee name are pooled together into larger pools with the holdings of the nominee. However, the data set contains information that can be utilized to discriminate between transactions executed by foreigners and by the nominee itself. The task of disintegrating the foreigners acting in nominee names further into different subtypes, such as individuals and institutions, is however made impossible by nominee registration. Further, the register does not separate indirect shareholdings through financial institutions, such as mutual funds. Indirect holdings are registered in the names of the financial institutions, and are thus treated as property of the financial institutions in this study. This is well in line with the purpose of this study, as financial institutions by Finnish law must exercise full control over the investment policy of their indirect holdings. Finnish firms. The study is conducted using annual earnings forecasts, issued during the year prior to the date when the actual earnings number is reported. In other words, we have only used FY1 6 forecasts.
The I/B/E/S data set
To diminish the possible effect of other information released simultaneously as the earnings forecast revisions, we drop those earnings revisions occurring in the two week period following an interim or annual report. The financial statement reporting dates are available through the Helsinki Stock Exchange. The HEX reporting date data set though restricts our sample to the period 1997-1999 and we furthermore limit our study to stocks listed on the more liquid main list 7 . Based on this sample we calculate analysts' earnings forecast revisions. Calculating the earnings forecast revisions for the time period and dropping the observations not recorded in the Datastream file 8 , results in 4 028 earnings forecast revisions. We further extract the extreme 100 observations of the total revisions sample, i.e. the event sample contains 50 positive and 50 negative earnings per share analyst revision.
Descriptive statistics
The total data set of Finnish earnings forecast revisions during 1.1.1997-31.12.1999 consists of 4 028 observations. We have extracted the 50 most positive and negative revisions and presented some descriptive statistics in Table 1 , panel A. The median of financial analyst earnings forecast revisions are 2% downwards. This negative median is consistent with the well-documented positive bias in analyst forecasts 9 , as analysts tend to adjust downwards their optimistic forecasts throughout the year. Furthermore, we restrict the event sample to only consist of positive (negative) earnings forecast revisions that are followed by a positive (negative) one week cumulative abnormal stock return. The one week cumulative abnormal stock return criteria is used in order to ensure that the measured earnings forecast revisions contain at least some new information that is not already publicly known. If an earnings forecast revision does not affect the share price it is questionable if the revision contained any information not already available to the market. The restriction reduces the event sample to 18 positive earnings forecast revisions and 22 negative revisions. Panel B in Table 1 exhibits some descriptive statistics on the restricted sample. Moreover, panel C displays the characteristics of one week cumulative abnormal returns.
[ Table 1 ] 7 Our preliminary analysis also shows that the earnings forecasts in the I/B/E/S data set are primarily issued for main list firms. 8 We use Datastream files to extract share price information. 9 For research on analyst's forecast bias see e.g. The data set that contains all investors' trading behavior prior to the most extreme positive (negative) earnings forecast revisions that are followed by a positive (negative) one week cumulative abnormal return, results in 9 151 observations. Descriptive statistics is presented in Table 2 . Households constitute the majority of the sample in terms of number of executed transactions, both when considering observations for positive and negative earnings forecast revisions.
[Table 2]
We furthermore extract a sub sample due to selling restrictions present at the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Investors that hold zero number of shares two weeks before an earnings forecast revision can only buy stock if they choose to act during the period, given that they are not able to short-sell the stock. Therefore we exclude investors that have a zero initial investment, and present investor trading behavior prior to positive and negative earnings forecast revisions for the main FCSD categories in Table 3 .
[ Table 3 ]
Results
This section is divided into two parts. In the former part, we display results from tests using the sample including investors with selling restrictions, i.e. those investors with a zero initial holding. In the latter part we employ the same tests as in the former part but on a reduced sample that excludes those investors who suffer from selling restrictions. Results from both samples are reported as both data sets have their drawbacks 10 . As average trading behavior for the different size groups are calculated by taking the equally weighted average of the investors' trading behavior, the sum of the average trading behavior for the different groups is not necessarily equal to zero 11 .
Results for the sample including investors with selling restrictions
The average trading behavior prior to positive and negative financial analyst earnings forecast revisions 10 Including investors with selling restrictions forces the smallest groups in the sample to on average purchase shares. Excluding investors suffering from selling restrictions, on the other hand, dramatically reduces the number of smaller investors in the sample. 11 Hence, the analysis might give an impression of the market not clearing, as the absolute size (in number of shares) of the transactions are not taken into account. However, we do not view this as a problem, as the analysis is focused on the behavior of the different investor groups. are presented in Table 4 . The results are based on the sample that includes investors with zero initial holdings. Small investors purchase shares, whereas larger investors reduce their holdings prior to financial analyst earnings forecast revisions. A factor possibly explaining the observed heterogeneous behavior for the different investor groups is that investing in stocks became increasingly popular amongst households in Finland during the time period 1997-1999. The differences between trading behavior prior to positive versus negative revisions are statistically significant for all investor size groups except Group 8. This indicates that investors' trading behavior is on average more positive (negative) in case of a positive (negative) earnings forecast revision.
[ Table 4 ] Figure 1 exhibits the investors' average trading behavior prior to positive and negative financial analyst earnings forecast revisions. The figure restates that on average the small investors purchase shares prior to financial analyst earnings forecast revisions, whereas larger investors on average sell prior to earnings forecast revisions.
[Figure 1]
In order to assess the economic importance of the different investors to financial analysts we calculate the initial holding also in terms of value. Table 5 exhibits investors' average trading behavior prior to positive and negative financial analyst earnings forecast revisions, grouped by the value of the initial holding. The results do not substantially deviate from the ones presented in Table 4 , i.e. smaller investors purchase shares and larger investors sell shares prior to financial analyst earnings forecast revisions. The changes in holdings for the smallest groups are 100%, due to the selling restrictions faced by an investor that possess zero shares initially. Again, the differences between trading behavior prior to positive versus negative revisions are statistically significant for all investor size groups. This indicates that investors' trading behavior is on average more positive (negative) in case of a positive (negative) earnings forecast revision.
[ Table 5 ] Figure 2 shows the investors', grouped according to the value of the initial holding, average trading behavior prior to positive and negative earnings forecast revisions. The pattern is mainly similar to the one in Figure 1 . The smallest investors are on average only purchasing shares prior to the earnings forecast revisions and larger investors are reducing their stock at the same time.
[Figure 2]
As the Finnish market is dominated by a small number of very large institutional investors, for whom sell side analysts compete, one could argue that the investigated groups are too large. In order to examine this line of argument, we look at the largest investors -measured by the value of their initial holdings -and compare their trading behavior prior to positive and negative earnings forecast revisions with the trading behavior of other investors. Table 6 exhibits the results based on the sample including investors with selling restrictions. The group with the largest 1% of initial holdings in terms of value consists of 38 and 53 observations for positive and negative revisions, respectively 12 .
The results displayed in Table 6 reveals that the largest investors reduce their holding regardless if the earnings forecast revision is positive or negative, as do the bulk of investors. The difference in trading behavior prior to positive and negative earnings forecast revisions is not significantly different from zero for the group consisting of the largest investors, i.e. we cannot detect any differences in trading behavior prior to positive or negative revisions for this group of investors. All other investors though on average reduce more of their holdings prior to a negative revision than a positive revision. These results clearly do not support the notion of analysts warning large investors of forthcoming earnings forecast revisions, rather the contrary.
[ Table 6 ]
Results for the sample excluding investors with selling restrictions
We further filter our sample of investors' trading behavior prior to earnings forecast revisions by excluding investors with selling restrictions. An investor that initially holds no shares is forced in our sample to purchase shares, as severe short selling restrictions are present for most shares traded on the Helsinki Stock Exchange. Therefore, we filter the sample to consist only of those investors that had the option either to accumulate or reduce their holdings prior to the earnings forecast revision. The results presented in this section are solely based on the sample excluding investors with selling restrictions. Table 7 displays investors' trading behavior prior to positive and negative earnings forecast revisions for different investor size groups for data that excludes investors with selling restrictions. Investor size groups are created by dividing the observations into 10 equally large groups according to the net holding in number of shares at date t-15 for each firm separately. We find that both larger and smaller investors tend to sell shares, regardless if the earnings forecast revisions are positive or negative 13 . All investors are though reducing their holdings to a larger extent prior to a negative earnings forecast revision than prior to a positive revision.
[Table 7]
Furthermore we group the sample excluding investors with selling restrictions in ten groups by the value of the initial holding. This is made in order to better assess the economic importance of investors to financial analysts. Table 8 exhibits the average investors' trading behavior prior to positive and negative financial analyst earnings forecast revisions grouped by the value of the initial holding. The results do not substantially deviate from the ones presented in Table 7 , i.e. both smaller and larger investors sell shares prior to financial analyst earnings forecast revisions. All ten groups show on average negative changes in holdings, which can be explained by the elimination of the investors with selling restrictions from the sample. The same pattern applies as earlier, i.e. the reduction of holdings is on average less prior to a positive earnings forecast revision than to a negative revision.
[ Table 8 ]
We furthermore extract the 1% largest investors from the sample excluding investors with selling restrictions. The number of observations in the 1% largest investors group is rather small, 25 for positive revisions and 42 for negative revisions 14 . The results in Table 9 show that the largest investors on average accumulate their holding prior to financial analysts' positive earnings forecast revisions and reduce their holding prior to negative forecast revisions. Furthermore, the rest of the investors on average reduce their holdings prior to earnings forecast revisions. The difference in investors' trading behavior prior to positive and negative earnings forecast revisions is for large investors close to significant, especially considering the small sample size. Although no conclusive inferences can be drawn from the results, the results could be interpreted as weak support for the notion that financial analysts leak information regarding forthcoming earnings 13 As investors with no initial holdings are excluded from this sample, the markets do not clear in this analysis. 14 However, we feel that the sample is not entirely driven by a few events, as we have 14 unique positive revisions and 20 unique negative revisions. forecast revisions to their largest clients.
[ Table 9 ]
Summary
Prior research shows that financial analyst's recommendations have an impact on the value of traded stock. A positive (negative) change in a financial analyst's recommendation is in general followed by positive (negative) returns. As the views of the financial analysts clearly impact the stock market, an investor might profit from having access to financial analyst earnings forecast revisions in advance. Indeed, some indications of analysts warning their clients have been in the air, as recently reported by the financial press. Using the unique official stock transactions data set from Finland combined with the analyst earnings forecast data set from I/B/E/S, we examine the trading behavior of investors prior to financial analysts' earnings forecast revisions. More specifically, we set out to investigate whether we can find indications of larger, or preferred, investors being warned of analyst forecast revisions in advance.
In summary, we do not find conclusive evidence of large investors systematically being warned of future earnings forecast revisions, as different groups of investors are found to behave fairly homogenously before both positive and negative earnings forecast revisions. However, the results indicate that the very largest investors show trading behavior consistent with being informed of future earnings forecast revisions.
In the light of this study, it hence appears as the recently widely discussed ethical problem of analysts leaking information to some preferred customers, is a fairly uncommon or insignificant problem in the stock market. Events are defined as the events with positive (negative) earnings revisions followed by a positive (negative) t+6 cumulative abnormal return. Investor trading behavior is measured as the number of stocks bought (sold) during the two weeks prior to the event divided by the total terminal (initial) number of stocks held. The investor trading behavior proxy hence expresses how a certain investor changes his/her holding in a certain company during the two weeks prior to the analyst earnings forecast revisions. Investor size groups are created by dividing the observations into 10 equally large groups according to the net holding in number of shares at date t-15 for each firm separately. The investor size identification is done for each firm separately in order to avoid having any investor group excessively dominated by transactions in few firms. Investor size is hence defined as a relative measure among investors that trade in the same stock. Events are defined as the events with positive (negative) earnings revisions followed by a positive (negative) t+6 cumulative abnormal return. Investor trading behavior is measured as the number of stocks bought (sold) during the two weeks prior to the event divided by the total terminal (initial) number of stocks held. The investor trading behavior proxy hence expresses how a certain investor changes his/her holding in a certain company during the two weeks prior to the analyst earnings forecast revisions. Investor size groups are created by dividing the observations into 10 equally large groups according to the net holding in terms of value at date t-15 for each firm separately. Table 4 . Investors' trading behavior prior to positive and negative earnings forecast revisions for different size groups measured according to the net holding in number of shares, including investors with selling restrictions This table displays average investor trading behavior prior to the disclosure of positive (Panel A) and negative (Panel B) analyst earnings forecast revisions. Revision events are defined as the events with the most positive (negative) earnings revisions and further meet the criteria of positive (negative) CAR t+6. Investor trading behavior is measured as the number of stocks bought (sold) during the two weeks prior to the event divided by the total terminal (initial) number of stocks held. The investor trading behavior proxy hence expresses how a certain investor changes his/her holding in a certain company during the two weeks prior to the disclosure of analyst earnings forecast revisions. Investor size groups are created by dividing the observations into 10 equally large groups according to the net holding in number of shares at date t-15 for each firm separately. The investor size identification is done for each firm separately in order to avoid having any investor group excessively dominated by transactions in few firms. Investor size is hence defined as a relative measure among investors that trade in the same stock. This Table 6 . 1% largest investors versus other investors' trading behavior prior to positive and negative earnings forecast revisions, including investors with selling restrictions This table displays average investor trading behavior prior to the disclosure of positive (Panel A) and negative (Panel B) analyst earnings forecast revisions. Revision events are defined as events with the most positive (negative) earnings revisions and further meet the criteria of positive (negative) CAR t+6. Investor trading behavior is measured as the number of stocks bought (sold) during the two weeks prior to the event divided by the total terminal (initial) number of stocks held. The investor trading behavior proxy hence expresses how a certain investor changes his/her holding in a certain company during the two weeks prior to the disclosure of analyst earnings forecast revisions. Investor size groups are created by extracting the 1% largest investors according to the net holding (EUR) at date t-15. This table includes the smallest investors, i.e. those that initially did not own the stock and due to short selling restrictions are only able to purchase the stock. The number of events, i.e. the number of earnings forecast revisions, for the largest 1% is 14 and 20 for positive and negative revisions respectively. SEM stands for Standard Error of Mean. Table 9 . 1% largest investors versus other investors' trading behavior prior to positive and negative earnings forecast revisions, excluding investors with selling restrictions This table displays average investor trading behavior prior to the disclosure of positive (Panel A) and negative (Panel B) analyst earnings forecast revisions. Revision events are defined as events with the most positive (negative) earnings revisions and further meet the criteria of positive (negative) CAR t+6. Investor trading behavior is measured as the number of stocks bought (sold) during the two weeks prior to the event divided by the total terminal (initial) number of stocks held. The investor trading behavior proxy hence expresses how a certain investor changes his/her holding in a certain company during the two weeks prior to the disclosure of analyst earnings forecast revisions. Investor size groups are created by extracting the 1% largest investors according to the net holding (EUR) at date t-15. This table excludes the smallest investors, i.e. those that initially did not own the stock and due to short selling restrictions are only able to purchase the stock. The number of events, i.e. the number of earnings forecast revisions, for the largest 1% is 14 and 20 for positive and negative revisions, respectively. SEM stands for Standard Error of Mean. 
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